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Abstract
Two parallel literatures have explored differences across legal and economic systems,
noting that countries can be loosely grouped into liberal vs. coordinated market economies
on the one hand, and common law vs. civil law countries on the other. These two groups
largely overlap. Liberal market economies (LMEs) tend to have a common law tradition,
while coordinated market economies (CMEs) belong to the civil law family (French or
German). This paper argues that this overlap is not coincidental. The link between legal
and economic systems are social preferences reﬂected in basic norms, or ground rules,
found in substantive and procedural laws of different countries. These ground rules are
more pervasive than their speciﬁc incarnation, such as codetermination in Germany, or
shareholder primacy in the United States. The paper develops a typology of ground rules,
distinguishing between “substantive” ground rules that allocate decision making rights to
either individuals or to the state/collective; and procedural ground rules that determine
whether the individual or a collective (or the state) have the primary or exclusive power
to seek judicial remedies. The paper uses examples from contract and corporate law to
illustrate these ground rules focusing on German law, as an example for the civil law
family and a CME, and the US as an example for a common law jurisdiction and LME.
An important implication of this analysis is that each system is highly path dependent and
that, therefore, marginal changes of speciﬁc incarnations of social preferences are unlikely
to fundamentally alter the nature of each system.
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I. Introduction

This contribution seeks to explain the affinity between the nature of economic
systems – coordinated market economies (CMEs) and liberal market economies (LMEs)
on the one hand, and legal origin (civil vs. common law systems) on the other. The paper
starts with the simple observation that LMEs tend to be common law jurisdictions, and
CMEs civil law jurisdictions. It proposes that the affinity between economic and legal
system offers important insights into the foundations of different types of market
economies and, in particular differences in the scope of the state vs. the powers of the
individual. The main argument is that the legal system serves as a coordination device for
social preferences. At the most basic level these social preferences are reflected in the
allocation of rights and responsibilities either to individuals or away from them – to the
collective or the state. These social preferences are reflected in legal ground rules
stipulating who has the power to determine the meaning and contents of private contracts
and who may seek outside help – judicial recourse – to settle disputes: the individual(s)
or the collective.
This paper uses examples drawn from contract and corporate law to illustrate this
point, but consciously refrains from making any value judgments. Moreover, each system
produces its own costs and benefits in economic, social, and political terms, and the
relative costs and benefits may change over time. Each system is highly path dependent.3
By implication, changes in a subset of rules that realize ground rules of the legal system,
such as the relaxation of mandatory provisions governing workers’ participation in

3

On the concept of path dependency, see Douglass Cecil North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and
Economic Performance, (1990), p. 11.
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corporate governance (co-determination) in countries that follow a stakeholder model, or,
conversely, the introduction of constituency statutes in systems that adhere to the
shareholder value model, will not fundamentally alter the basic nature of the respective
legal or economic system.

II. Types of Market Economies

Recent years have seen a renewed interest in comparing different types of market
economies, or capitalist systems. Hall’s and Soskice’s publication of “Varieties of
Capitalism”4 is only the culmination of a voluminous literature in political sciences on
this issue. In economics, the collapse of the socialist system has precipitated substantial
interest in comparing different types of capitalist systems.5
Observers of European economies have long noted differences across economic
systems that are all built on principles of market economies, yet apply them quite
differently in practice. Much of this literature has focused on the distinction between
corporatist and market systems. Indicators for corporatist systems have varied
substantially across the literature and attempts to standardize them have not been entirely

4

Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism, (2001).
Simeon Djankov et al., The New Comparative Economics, 31 Journal of Comparative Economics 595-619
(2003). To be sure, there has been a substantial and growing literature on the new institutional economics,
which predates the collapse of the socialist system. See only Douglass Cecil North, Structure and Change
in Economic History, ed. 1st ed. (1981; Douglass Cecil North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and
Economic Performance, (1990) and Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms,
Markets, Relational Contracting, (1985).
5
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satisfying. Indeed, there is often little correlation of what different scholars proclaimed to
be the core characteristics of corporatist systems.6
More recently, it has been proposed to simplify the classification and distinguish
only between coordinated and liberal market economies.7 A major reason for this
reclassification has been the difficulty of identifying basic characteristics of corporatism
in all countries for which a broad consensus exists that they were certainly not pure
market economies. Japan is the most glaring example. While there is widespread
agreement that in Japan the government plays an important coordinating function, it is
equally clear that labour unions are not nearly as strong as in the European corporatist
economies. Moreover, the size and reach of welfare programs as well as processes of
policy formation differ markedly from European corporatist systems.8
Following Hall and Soskice9 I define liberal market economies (LMEs) as
economies in which “firms coordinate their activities primarily via hierarchies and
competitive market arrangements” and where “the equilibrium outcomes of firm
behaviour are usually given by demand and supply conditions”. Coordinated market
economies (CMEs), by contrast, are economies in which “firms depend more heavily on
non-market relationships to coordinate their endeavours with other actors to construct
their core competencies”. Hall and Soskice refrain from developing a detailed list of
indicators to distinguish between the two types of economies, but highlight some core

6

For a comprehensive analysis of indicators of corporatism and their interaction, see Lane Kenworthy,
Quantitative Indicators of Corporatism: A Survey and Assessment, 00/4 Max Planck Institut für
Gesellschaftsforschung Discussion Paper (2000).
7
David Soskice, Reinterpreting Corporatism and Explaining Unemployment: Co-ordinated and Noncoordinated Market Economies: The Case for an Extended Perspective, Labour Relations and Economic
Performance Renato Brunetta & Carolo Dell'Ariga 170-214 (1990).
8
Alan Siaroff, Corporatism in 24 Industrial Democracies: meaning and Measurement, 36 European
Journal of Policy Research 175-205 (1999).
9
Supra note 4 in their introduction at pp. 8.
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characteristics, such as formal contracting vs. relational contracting, competition vs.
coordination, and different institutions for exchanging information, monitoring
behaviour, and sanctioning defection.10 Based on these general characteristics, they
classify 17 leading OECD countries as follows (Table 1).

[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]

Comparative law scholars and readers familiar with the new comparative economics
literature (which emphasizes the importance of legal families),11 will note that all LMEs
are common law countries, and that all CMEs are civil law countries.12 This relation
could be spurious. However, as I will argue below, there is a strong affinity between
economic and legal institutions. The link between the type of legal system and the type of
market economy, I suggest, are ground rules that allocate basic control rights. These
ground rules do not necessarily originate in law, but they reveal social preferences, which
have become deeply rooted in law and complementary legal institutions.

III. Legal Ground Rules and the Scope of the State

None of the characteristics that are commonly attributed to LMEs or CMEs, i.e.
arms length vs. relations contracting, competition vs. coordination, directly refer to the
role of the state. However, an important role of the state is implied in both types of
10

Ibid at p. 10 following Ostrom’s classification of core functions of institutions. See Elinor Ostrom,
Governing the Commons - The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, (1990).
11
The basic paper is Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. Pol. Econ. 1113-1155 (1998).
12
Comparative law scholars subdivide the civil law family into the French, the German, and the
Scandinavian legal families – all of which are represented in this sample.
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market economies. In the ideal type LMEs where formal contracting is said to prevail,
disputes are resolved and contracts enforced by a “neutral arbiter”.13 Typically this
neutral arbiter is a state court. In this case the state provides a public good in the form of
law and legal institutions in whose shadow parties can negotiate, and re-negotiate private
contracts, and on which they can rely for enforcing their contractual rights and
obligations.14 The state also plays an important role in safeguarding competition by way
of antitrust regulation.15 In CMEs, a more expansive role of the state is typically
assumed. This role can take the form of coordinating bargains among social partners
(labour and employers), or may amount to increasing interventionism.16
The major difference in ground rules between CMEs and LMEs is the extent to
which individuals vs. collectives or the state are vested with important control rights.
Ground rules in this context refer to how a legal system allocates the power to determine
the meaning and contents of agreements among private parties (substantive ground rule);
and to initiate judicial review (procedural ground rule). This argument differs from
standard arguments that view the major differences between the two systems in more

13

(North, 1991) at p. [].
There is an extensive literature on non-legal sanctions. See only Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and
The State of Nature, 1 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 5-32 (1985) and David Charny,
Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 Harvard L. Rev. 375-467 (1990).
15
For a thorough treatment of antitrust law and corporate control in the US, compare Neil Fligstein, The
Transformation of Corporate Control, (1990). For a more critical assessment of the need for state
intervention and the efficacy of the antitrust regime that has evolved, see Harold Demsetz, 100 Years of
Antitrust: Should We Celebrate?, George Mason University School of Law: Law and Economics Center
(1991). The nature of antitrust regulation in LMEs and CMEs has changed considerably over time. The US
was a major advocate of antitrust law since the late 19th century and in fact transplanted this law to many
CMEs (Germany and Japan after the second world warp). Prior to this, Germany actively fostered cartels
and thereby created an environment based on extensive bargaining. Gerald Spindler, Recht und Konzern Interdependenzen der Rechts- und Unternehmensentwicklung in Deutschland und den USA, (1993). In
recent years, however, antitrust authorities retreated from intervening more aggressively in market forces.
By contrast, the EU has taken a more aggressive role.
16
See Horst Siebert, Corporatist vs. Market Approaches to Governance, this volume (2004).
14
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extensive codification in the civil law system as opposed to the common law system.17
Along this dimension there is arguably a substantial degree of convergence, as common
law jurisdictions have made increasingly use of statutory law,18 and civil law jurisdictions
have witnessed the growth of case law to interpret and apply their codes to ever new
circumstances.19 The comparative law literature has taken a broader view, noting that
major differences between legal families lie in “legal stiles” (Rechtsstile).20 Elements that
form a legal style are said to include history, the prevailing method of legal thought,
particular legal institutions characteristic of that style, the sources of law, and ideological
factors, the nature of the legal profession, and ultimate history.21 These elements are
helpful for identifying differences across legal systems, but the analysis remains very
much at a descriptive level.
This paper seeks to take the analysis a step further by identifying basic constraints
that have shaped the evolution of different legal systems in a path dependent fashion.
Analytically, this approach is close to the new institutional economics, in particular to
North’s work on institutions and institutional change.22 North argues that institutions are
the basic rules of the game, be they formal and informal. They constrain human action by

17

See, for example, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. Pol. Econ.
1113-1155 (1998) with further references. See also Katharina Pistor et al., The Evolution of Corporate Law,
23 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 791-871 (2002) who compare the
evolution of corporate law across countries and find that civil law countries are somewhat less flexible than
common law countries.
18
The Companies Act of 1844 codified UK corporate law. In the US, the 1811 New York corporate law
marked the beginning of a trend of codifying this law at the state level. In addition, the 1933 Securities Act
and the 1934 Securities and exchange act codified the law that governed investor protection.
19
The best evidence for this is the sheer length of standard commentaries to § 242 of the German Civil
Code. For a theoretical treatment of the impact of socio-economic and technological change on law,
compare Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Incomplete Law, 35 Journal of International Law and Politics
931-1013 (2003).
20
See Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kötz, Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung auf dem Gebiet des
Privatrechts, 1 ed. 2 1 vols (1984) at p. 78.
21
Ibid at p. 79.
22
Douglass Cecil North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, (1990).
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shaping the expectation of individual actors about the behaviour of others.23 Institutional
change is path dependent, because expectations change slowly and existing constraints
therefore influence actions not only today, but also in the future.24 Not every rule
constraints human action in a path dependent fashion. Moreover, not only formal law, but
also social habits do change over time, and often radically.25 The task therefore is to
identify basic norms, or ground rules, that are “sticky” and therefore shape the style of a
legal and economic system.
The claim is that the basic allocation of substantive and procedural powers to
either individuals or the collective/state constitute such ground rules. Whatever their
historical origins – and this paper does not make any claims about how they have come
about26 – social expectations about how conflicts would be resolved and by whom
influence bargaining choices at the contracting stage. Moreover, the interplay between
substantive and procedural ground rules may facilitate private contracting and judicial
review, or else create conditions under which relational contracting or collective decision
making prevails.

23

See also Masahiko Aoki, Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis, (2001) at p. 11, who defines
institutions as “sustainable systems of shared beliefs.”
24
On evolution and change in legal systems, see Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics,
109 Harvard L. Rev. 641-668 (1996). For a related argument on the path-dependency of corporate law,
compare also Lucian Bebchuk & Mark Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Governance and
Ownership, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 127-170 (1999) as well as the edited volume by Jeff Gordon & Mark Roe,
Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance, (2004).
25
Kahn-Freund has suggested long ago that areas that were often thought to be not amenable to
fundamental change or legal convergence, such as family and inheritance law, have indeed converged
substantially in the 20th century. See Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 The
Modern Law Review 1-27 (1974).
26
For a – problematic – attempt to trace the origins of legal systems back to the 11th century, see Edward L.
Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 Q. J. Econ. 1193-1229 (2002). Economic historians and
economic sociologist, by contrast, regard the confrontation with industrialization and emerging capitalism
as the formative period for today’s economies. See Gerschenkron for basic argument Alexander
Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, Alexander Gerschenkron 5-71 (1962)
and more recently Neil Fligstein, The Architecture of Markets, (2001).
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Substantive Ground Rules
Substantive ground rules determine the extent to which private relations are either
contractible or are governed by mandatory law. The most prominent example is the
mandatory nature of corporate law in Germany, and its extensive contractibility in
Delaware.27 Substantive ground rules also establish to what extent issues that are
contractible in principle are still subject to over-riding social norms. Every society knows
fundamental norms that cannot be contracted out of. Such norms are recognized, for
example, in international conventions that allow countries to refuse abidance by the
norms set out therein, if their enforcement violates their ordre public (or public policy).28
I exclude these fundamental norms from this analysis. Instead, the paper focuses on the
more subtle guidance of contractual relations, as expressed in norms that require
contracting “in good faith” or similar general clauses, which allow for review of private
transactions on the basis of social, or collective norms, not only individual aspirations.29
The distinction between contractible vs. non-contractible on the one hand and
unconstrained vs. socially conditioned freedom of contract is depicted in Figure 1 below.

[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]

27

On the debate about the extent of mandatory vs. enabling corporate law in the US and the desirability of
more mandatory standards, compare Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89
Colum. L. Rev. 1549-1598 (1989; Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for
Mandatory Corporate Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1599-1617 (1989; John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 16181691 (1989).
28
See most prominently the 1958 New York Convention on the International Sales of Goods, Art. V.2.
29
On the “good faith” principle in continental European contract law and its “transplantation” into UK law,
see Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: How Unifying Law Ends up in New Divergences, Varieties of
Capitalism Peter A. Hall & David Soskice 417-441 (2001) and the further discussion below, note 32 and
accompanying text.

9

The cells inside the matrix make predictions about the kind of contracts parties
will enter into, and the nature of governance mechanisms they will employ in light of the
substantive ground rule. The upper left and the lower right hand corners give the two
extremes – highly individualized contracts with extensive judicial review on the one
hand, and mandatory regulation of socially sensitive issues, on the other. In the latter
case, judicial enforcement mechanisms may exist, but their primary function is to enforce
the mandatory rules, not to resolve a dispute between parties with (assumed) equal
bargaining power. In the real world we are likely to observe mixed responses to these
constraints. Put differently, the argument is not that freedom of contract absent social
norm conditions means that parties will always revert to judicial enforcement of their
rights, but that they will be more likely to seek judicial review when they have reached an
impasse, than parties contracting in a system with extensive social norm conditionality.
There are two possible explanations for this. In the absence of well established social
norms that might help resolve a dispute, parties may be in greater need of third party
intervention.30 Alternatively, they might be less fearful of social norm conditions
imposed on them in the process of litigation.31

Procedural Ground Rules
Procedural ground rules determine the extent to which individuals have access to
judicial review for resolving disputes. A procedural ground rule can take different forms.
30

The predictability of the outcome of a case seems to create incentives for parties to settle voluntarily and
thus save litigation costs. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation,
13 J. Legal Stud. 1-55 (1984).
31
These propositions are only suggestive. While it is possible to document differences in substantive
ground rules, the incidence of judicial enforcement of contracts is difficult, if not impossible to verify in the
absence of comprehensive data on contracts, including relational contracts, which by definition are difficult
to verify and record.
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It may grant universal justiciability, where in principle any dispute may be brought to
court, or delegated justiciability, where only those issues that are explicitly mentioned by
law may be subject to judicial law enforcement. Moreover, the law may allocate the
initiation right to individuals, the collective, a state agent, or a combination of the above
(See Figure 2 below).

[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]

The nature of procedural ground rules determines the extent of formal vs.
relational contracting and the use of formal judicial review. Where the ground rule
stipulates that collectives (the shareholder meeting) rather than individuals have the
initiation right, litigation is less likely. The reason is that collectives typically face
substantial “collective action costs”32 in making a decision. They may have access to
alternative governance devices, and mutual monitoring and reputation bonds, including
political bonding devices, or may simply concede power to those who exercise de facto
control rights. By contrast, if the initiation right is firmly vested with individuals, it is
likely to be used more frequently. The downside for this allocation of control rights is
that individuals may hold up transactions that might be beneficial for others. This
outcome, however, can be avoided by switching from property to liability rules.33

32

Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, ed. Rev. ed.
(1971).
33
For the conceptual distinction between property and liability rules in the law, see Guido Calabresi &
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, Harvard
L. Rev. 1089 (1972). For an analysis of conflict of interest rules in corporate law from this perspective,
compare Zohar Goshen, The Efficiency of Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory meets Reality, 91 Cal. L. Rev.
(2003).
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The above argument notwithstanding, procedural ground rules are not the only
determinants of the level of litigation one might observe in a given jurisdiction. Other
factors, such as the cost of litigation, the independence, impartiality, and efficacy of the
judiciary, and the availability of alternative dispute settlement and enforcement
mechanisms will also play a role. Still, ground rules will effect the parties’ bargaining
strategy ex ante and influence the kind of monitoring systems they will establish. I would
therefore posit that the scope of relational vs. arms-length contracting is, to a large extent,
a function of the procedural ground rule. Where individuals may initiate litigation as a
default, they may be less inclined to safeguard their contracts by alternative mechanisms.
By contrast, where the right to take recourse to the courts (and the formal legal system) is
restricted, either because the law allows judicial recourse only when it explicitly says so,
or because a collective, rather than an individual holds the initiation right, the propensity
to use non-legal mechanisms increases.

Ground Rules in LMEs vs CMEs
Applying this analytical framework to CMEs and LMEs, preliminary evidence
suggests a fairly consistent pattern with respect to the allocation of substantive review
and procedural initiation powers.34 LMEs tend to rely on extensive contractibility that is
not socially conditioned and on individual/universal enforcement rights. By contrast,
CMEs condition freedom of contract on compliance with broadly accepted social norms
and re-enforce this condition by limiting individual access to judicial review.35

34

This conclusion is drawn from the analysis of the US and the German system that follows. More
extensive research would be needed to substantiate the conclusion for other countries.
35
This proposition is based on a limited review of CMEs and LMEs – primarily on Germany on the one
hand and the UK as well as the US on the other.
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[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]

Ground rules embedded in formal law also influence the scope of state monitoring
of private economic activities and the nature of judicial review, i.e. whether its purpose is
primarily the enforcement of individual rights, or of justice understood as a social good.
Law and legal institutions are important determinants of state involvement in the
economy. This is most explicit in the case of specific rules designed to enforce these
norms and can be most easily found in the areas of labour and social law. This should,
however, not distract from the fact that the law functions as a coordination device for
enforcing social preferences across the legal system. In the absence of specific
legislation, the interpretation and enforcement of these norms is typically left of the
courts who monitor private contracts and subject them to social norm conditions.

IV. Substantive Ground Rules in Private Law

This section seeks to substantiate the above propositions with examples drawn
from contract law, and corporate law primarily in two jurisdictions: Germany and the US.
The areas of the law were selected to highlight the propensity of ground rules that may
influence adjudication across different areas of the law and to demonstrate that they are
not limited to the regulation of codetermination or labour law, areas that are most
commonly selected to illustrate differences between LMEs and CMEs. Legal ground
rules in areas of the law not typically targeted by legislation designed to re-enforce the

13

choice of a particular, and perhaps temporary, economic model, give greater credence to
the argument that law serves as a coordination device between widely held social
preferences and economic outcomes. An important implication of this argument is that
altering specific legal realizations of such ground rules will not alter the social
preferences on which a legal system rests. A moderate amount of judicial activism may
ensure maintenance of the status quo, as judges may use general clauses (i.e. the good
faith principle in contract law, or notions of the “interest of the corporation”) to reenforce social preferences even after specific legal incarnations of such principles have
been abolished.

Ground Rules in Contract Law
The most prominent example of a substantive ground rule in contract law is the
“good faith principle” in most continental European legal systems – which incidentally
are CMEs and civil law countries. In Germany, the provision can be found in section 242
of the Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch).36 The principle has been incorporated into
a European directive,37 and as such has made its way into the UK legal system – a LME
and common law country. In analyzing the likely impact of the directive on the UK legal
system, Gunther Teubner characterizes the bona fide principle as “clearly one of the
unique expressions of continental legal culture”.38 He notes that the principle has been
used to infuse communitarian principles into contract law, or as “contract law’s recourse
36

“Der Schuldner ist verpflichtet, die Leistung so zu bewirken, wie Treu und Glauben mit Rücksicht auf
die Verkehrssitte es erfordern”. (The obligor must perform in a manner consistent with good faith taking
into account accepted practice).
37
Regulation 4 of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, SI 1994 No 3159, implementing the EU
Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 (OJ L95,
21 April 1993: 29).
38
Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: How Univying Law Ends up in New Divergences, Varieties of
Capitalism in Peter A. Hall & David Soskice (eds.), 417-441 (2001) at p. 427.
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to social morality.”39 The principle has been used as an overriding social condition for
private contracts, which in principle are governed by the “freedom of contract”. It is less
clear whether the drafters of the civil code anticipated this development or had even
meant this provision to serve this purpose. Arguably to the contrary, the framers of the
German code had sought to limit the extent to which contractual parties could escape
their obligations because of their limitations in adequately forecasting future events or
anticipating all future contingencies. The overriding principle the German Civil Code of
1900 – which was deplored by Otto von Giercke as lacking even a drop of social oil established was that “pacta sunt servanda”.40 It explicitly rejected a widely accepted legal
principle known prior to the codification of the civil code according to which each
contract was based on implicit assumptions, i.e. the “foundation of the transaction”
(Geschäftsgrundlage), and that serious deviations from this foundation would justify an
escape from contractual obligations.41 This older principle was revived only in the wake
of hyperinflation in the 1920s. The rigid enforcement of the principle “pacta sunt
servanda (without indexing for inflation) resulted in an “endogenous legal boom”42 that
almost brought the judicial system to its knees, as the failure to account for galloping
inflation resulted in a flood of cases brought by creditors who rushed to the courts to
contain losses that grew larger by the day. In the inter-war period, the principle was
primarily used to adjust prices to take account of inflation. However, in the post war era,
the principle was more extensively used in cases where imbalances in the original
39

Ibid at 431 quoting Esser and Wieacker.
See John P. Dawson, Judicial Revision of Frustrated Contracts: Germany, 63 Boston University Law
Review (1983) for an excellent English language survey of the developments that led to a change of this
doctrine in subsequent case law.
41
The relevant principle is the so-called clausula rebus sic stantibus. Ibid, at 1040.
42
Holger C. Wolf, Endogenous Legal Booms, 9 The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 181-187
(1993).
40
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contract resulted from the “discovery of unkown facts or the occurrence of unexpected
events”43 in cases where parties had not made provisions for such events, nor had they
allocated the risk for unanticipated events among themselves. This practice has found
widespread acceptance and as a result has been incorporated in a recent revision of the
Civil Code.44
By contrast, a general principle of good faith is not part of the common law
tradition.45 Courts invoke general principles of reasonableness, fairness, and good faith,
or rather the absence of bad faith, but they are likely to interpret them in the context of a
specific case and give much credence to the parties’ intent. These principles are not
abstract doctrines that could be invoked to condition private contracts on the basis of
social norms. Moreover, the doctrine of frustration, which is closest to the “foundation of
contracts” doctrine in the German tradition, is used to discharge both parties of their
duties when performance of a contract becomes impossible. It is not, however, an
invitation to courts to adjust contracts consistent with some over-riding principles of
justice of fairness.46
Against this background, Teubner predicted that the “transplantation” of the bona
fide principle will cause irritation in the UK legal system. As Teubner pointed out, it
was, however, unlikely that the introduction of this principle would radically transform
UK contract law. Instead, it was more likely that the principle’s meaning and contents
will be transformed when courts apply it to specific cases. This is so, because the UK
43
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legal and economic system is based on a different set of principles, which are unlikely to
be affected by the selective incorporation of foreign legal principles.47 The latter is
characterized by the principles of arms length contracting in a market based system and
case by case review of judicial disputes. Teubner’s predictions about the limited impact
of the good faith principle in UK contract law are supported by subsequent case law, and
more explicitly, by a review of this case law by the Lando Commission charged with
developing the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL).48 The Commission
explicitly criticizes English courts for failing to use the good faith principle to contradict
or overrule express contractual terms.
A recent study by Zimmermann and Whittaker49 suggests that there are more
commonalities between continental European jurisdictions and English common law
when it comes to good faith principles than is typically acknowledged. They survey the
general principles of the law as well as a series of typical case studies and find that in
most instances English law reaches the same conclusions as civil law jurisdictions of
continental Europe.50 The argument put forward in this contribution is not necessarily at
odds with their findings. This contribution focuses on frustration of contracts, not on
other aspects of good faith. More importantly, we are less concerned with the question
whether broadly defined good faith principles can be found in English law, but in the
allocation of decision making powers and their use to either re-enforce the parties will or
impose social conditions on private contracts. From this vantage point, it appears that
German law is more inclined to impose social conditionality, whereas English law is
47
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much more wedded to principles such as caveat emptor (buyer beware) and individual
parties’ risk taking.51 Moreover, judges in Germany are more likely to overrule and
actively adapt a contract, than judges in the UK. The same does not necessarily hold for
all civil law jurisdictions, however. In comparison with German law, French law appears
to be more formalistic and less open to judicial intervention.52
Another counter argument against the suggestion that the “good faith” principle in
contracts is alien to the common law system, is that this principle can also be found in the
US Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).53 This general principle, which resembles
Continental European (as well as PECL) notions of good faith has, however, been
enforced in a manner that is more consistent with UK practices than civil law practices,
with Germany being the most prominent case. In fact, the official comment to the
relevant UCC provision stresses that the good faith doctrine “merely directs a court
towards interpreting contracts within the commercial context in which they are created,
performed, and enforced….”54 In other words, the provision is not meant to be used by
courts to contradict or override express contractual terms.55 Importantly, the UCC
Permanent Editorial Board concluded after reviewing some of the case law that had
emerged that section 1-203 “does not support a cause of action where no other basis for a
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cause of action exists.”56 As Flechtner observes, while the wording of the good faith
principle in the UCC might resemble those of the PECL or even the German civil code,
in practice, in the US the good faith principle is a weak interpretative tool. And he goes
on to suggest that “this undoubtedly reflects the traditional distrust in the English
common law tradition, which is the foundation for U.S. contract law, of the vagueness of
the good faith concept, and the sense that a strong good faith principle would give judges
a dangerous power to create contractual obligations to which parties had not actually
agreed.”57 This, of course, is in contrast to legal practice in Germany, where the good
faith principle – as described above - has been widely used as an independent cause of
action and has allowed courts to develop extensive “case law” beyond the specific
strictures of the civil code.
The comparison of “good faith” doctrines in common and civil law also helps
refute the widely held notion that the main difference between the major legal systems is
the greater “rigidity” or formalism of law in codified systems, or the more limited power
of judges in civil law as opposed to common law system.58 As this example demonstrates,
in crucial areas civil law judges wield much more power and have much greater
discretion than common law judges do. More important than this stylized comparison
seems to be the extent to which judges are empowered to subject private contracts to
social norm conditionality. This is where civil law judges can exert their greater powers
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and where common law judges are restricted to the will of the original contracting
parties.

Default Rules in Corporate Law
The fundamental ground rule for corporate law in Germany has been up to now
first, that corporate law is not contractible, and second, that the interests of the
corporation include the interests of all stakeholders without a single group prevailing over
another. The corollary of a mandatory corporate law is limiting firms’ choice over the
corporate law they may wish to choose for incorporation. Not surprisingly, until recently
Germany adhered to the so called “seat theory”, which required a company to be
incorporated where its headquarters were located. This theory came under attack by the
European Court of Justice, which held in the famous Überseering Decision that certainly
a denial of legal personhood for a corporation that had been legally incorporated in
another member state, simply because – under German law - this corporation had changes
its seat without re-incorporating there, breached the principle of freedom of establishment
under the European Union Treaty.59 Subsequently Germany’s Supreme Court has moved
away from the seat theory.60 Still, the legal implications for a German corporation that
wishes to re-incorporate elsewhere are yet to be clarified. Even here European law is
likely to change the landscape in the future. The Regulation on the European Company
(Societas Europaea) allows corporations from at least two member states to merge into
one governed by the regulation and the law of the member state where the now merged
59
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company is located.61 It has been suggested that this regulation could open the door to
greater choice for the place of incorporation in Europe62 and thus undermine each
member state’s “monopoly” over regulating the affairs of corporations that are operating
within its jurisdiction. The point is that while change is under way, the traditional
approach to corporate law in Germany has been one that limited firms’ choice and placed
the governance structure of firms firmly under socially agreed upon norms. The noncontractibility of German law is still reflected in a provision in the code that stipulates
that the corporate charters may not deviate from statutory except where explicitly
provided for.63
By contrast, the ground rule in English and American corporate law is that
corporate law is contractible except where otherwise stated in the law. Most importantly,
English and US corporate law have traditionally allowed corporations to choose their
place of incorporation. Implicit in this choice is the power to opt out of the social
consensus in the jurisdiction where the corporation is operating. This choice reflects a
preference for individual choice by companies – or their management64 - over social
consensus with regards to the principles that shall govern a corporation’s affairs.
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Consistently with this general approach, corporate law tends to be less mandatory. As is
well known, the law of the state of Delaware is among the most “enabling” corporate
statues in the common law world, with most of the statutory provisions providing opt-out
or fall back clauses rather than mandatory law.65 English company law provides a middle
ground in that it firmly vests shareholders with basic control rights, but, in comparison to
the law of Delaware, is more restrictive in allowing opt outs or the delegation of control
rights from shareholders to the board of directors.66
The nature of corporate law as contractible vs. non-contractible (or mandatory vs.
enabling) has important implications for complementary institutions that evolved over
time.67 A mandatory law relies heavily on the enforcement of these provisions ex ante
when the company registrar reviews the consistency between the charter’s provisions and
statutory law. Since every change in the charter must be recorded, violations can be
detected when they are registered. In the eyes of ex ante lawmakers, there was therefore
little apparent need for ex post judicial review. It should, however, be noted that it has
become increasingly obvious that everyday management decisions that do not require
registration may endanger stakeholder interests just as much, but largely escape judicial
review, mostly because procedural ground rules limit the justiciability of corporate
decision making (see below).
By contrast, when corporate law is contractible, violations of the law are harder to
detect and require more extensive ex post review. The major complementary device to a
65
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contractible corporate law is therefore judicial review. With case law establishing the
limits of private contracting, the need for statutory restrictions may in fact diminishes
over time.68 To be sure, judicial review as the only check on free contracting is
increasingly challenged in particular by the growing influence of mandatory federal law
in the US, which is intruding on traditional territory of state corporate law.69 This trend
may suggest a shift in the ground rule in the US corporate law system from one that
relied primarily on private contracting to one that is increasingly regulated by federal law.
So far, however, the trend has not gone far enough to suggest a fundamental shift. The
reason is that both securities regulations and corporate law in the US continue to be
almost silent about the substantive norms that shall govern the corporate contract.
Instead, both statutory and case law focus largely on process rather than substance. This
is most apparent in the interpretation of the directors’ and officers’ fiduciary duties.
Judicial review of the duty of care has developed into a review of procedures except
where the substance meets the threshold of “bad faith” or “waste”. The doctrinal device
is the business judgment rule which stipulates that judges will not second-guess the
decision of directors or officers or try to impose their own or “society’s” values on them.
Instead, they will review only, whether a decision was made at all, whether the decision
was informed, and whether it was below the bad faith threshold.70 Statutory law in
Delaware even allows corporate charters to eliminate directors’ liability for duty of care
violations except when they meet the bad faith threshold.71 Defining the threshold as “bad
faith” rather than superimposing a “good faith” review by the courts – as is the case for
68
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private contracts in civil law system - is crucial, because it limits the scope of judicial
review and, by implication, the extent to which social norms can be invoked to limit
contractibility in substance.72
The duty of loyalty review also focuses primarily on procedure. Transactions are
not void, just because they were conflicted, as long as the conflict was disclosed and the
transaction was approved by disinterested directors or shareholders.73 Even when courts
apply the entire fairness test, they restrict their review to fair dealing and fair price. The
first prong once again focuses on procedure; only the latter gives more room for debate
over substance. Even here, much of the assessment is left to experts as judges try to avoid
deciding matters beyond the strictures of the law. The Sarbanes Oxley Act, which was
enacted in 2002 in response to the uncovering or corporate scandals in the wake of the
“dot com bubble” follows this tradition. To the extent federal law intrudes into the realm
of state law by regulating details of the corporation’s governance structure, the manner of
regulation remains primarily procedural, not substantive. Corporations require audit
committees with independent directors;74 corporate officers need to sign of corporate
financials and stipulate that they have read them75 and are required to create governance
structures that will help detect any misrepresentation of information at an early stage.76
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An exception to this pattern is the prohibition of credit contracts between the corporation
and its management.77 This explicit prohibition comes close to the substantive regulation
of corporate affairs under German corporate law, where credit contracts between the
corporation and members of the management board are prohibited, unless approved by
the supervisory board.78
In general, German law denies directors or shareholders a voting right in the case
of conflicted transactions.79 This is true, even if the others were informed about the
decision. Moreover, German statutory law regulates the standard of behavior for key
corporate constituencies to a much larger extent than does US or English corporate law.
Statutory law thus functions as a guideline for corporate conduct, even where it lacks
specific enforcement mechanisms. Apparently, the lawmaker thought these guidelines to
be largely self-enforcing.80 An example are legal standards about executive
compensation. German law provides that compensations paid to the members of the
management board (i.e. the executives) must be “reasonably related” to the tasks of the
respective board member and to the overall situation of the corporation.81 This provision,
which was introduced into the law 1937, had never been enforced or interpreted by a
court until the Mannesmann trial of 2004. In this case, the payment of, according to
German standards, a hefty “appreciation award” in the amount of Euro 15 Mln to the
CEO of Mannesmann, Klaus Esser, resulted in a criminal investigation that gave a
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criminal court the opportunity to interpret this provision. Esser had been appointed CEO
of Mannesmann fourteen month prior to the merger agreement. His compensation
package included fixed salary and boni, but no stock options or a proviso for the event of
a takeover or other change of control. Vodafone of UK launched a hostile tender offer for
Mannesmann in November 1999. By February 2000, the virulent defense Mannesmann
mounted under the leadership of Klaus Esser was crumbling. At that time Vodafone and
Mannesmann agreed to a friendly merger. The conditions favored Mannesmann
shareholders when compared with the initial offer. In particular, the value of the
exchange ratio had increased by Euro 65 bln.82 Two days after the merger agreement was
signed, the presidium of Mannesmann’s supervisory board met and agreed to pay Esser
(and others) an appreciation award of 15 Mln.83 The decision had the support from
Vodafone (i.e. the acquirer) and Mannesmann’s then still largest shareholder.
Several shareholders notified the state prosecutor of a potential breach of the duty
of trust (Untreue) under German criminal. The relevant provision sanctions a serious
breach of trust by someone who was charged with taking care of someone else’s property
or assets. A violation of the criminal law depended on whether the extra-compensation
violated any provisions of the corporate law. The court held that it did. It pointed out that
the extra compensation was not “reasonably related” to any “task” the CEO, Klaus Esser,
had yet to perform. In particular, the German word in the provision “Aufgabe” meant,
according to the court, that the compensation had to be paid for future tasks. At the time
82
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the appreciation award was granted, however, all tasks related to the merger had already
been performed and Esser had thus already been fully compensated for them. Neither was
there a “reasonable relation” between the extra compensation and the situation of the
corporation. The court pointed out that under German law, the interests of the corporation
are not limited to shareholder value. A broader assessment of the situation of the
corporation at the time the appreciation award was granted should have included an
assessment of the fact that Mannesmann was losing its independence as a result of the
merger and that some of its subsidiaries were to be spun off. Having concluded that the
payment constituted a breach of corporate law, the court nevertheless acquitted, because
the breach of trust did not meet the threshold required under criminal law. In this context
the court stressed that the decision had been made by the correct body, that it had been
informed and that the results of the decision had been disclosed in accordance with legal
requirements.
Contrast this decision with the arguments of the Delaware courts in the context of
the shareholder derivative action against Disney corporation because of breach of
fiduciary duty related to a compensation and termination package for the company’s vice
president, Michael Ovitz, a personal friend of the president Michael Eisner. Ovitz had
received a substantial compensation package including a fixed salary, bonuses and stock
options when he joined the corporation in the fall of 1995. The package was approved by
the board, but it remains unclear, how well they had informed themselves prior to
approving the package.84 When he left the company less than a year later, he negotiated
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with Eisner a no-fault termination, which was also approved by the board. This allowed
him to walk away with a total compensation of US$ 140 Mln.85
Delaware Supreme Court strenuously avoided any judgment of the level of
compensation. Instead, the court stipulated the standard of review narrowly and in line
with the procedural nature of court review of directors’ action:86
“The inquiry here is not whether we would disdain the composition, behaviour
and decisions of Disney's Old Board or New Board as alleged in the Complaint if
we were Disney stockholders. In the absence of a legislative mandate, that
determination is not for the courts. That decision is for the stockholders to make
in voting for directors, urging other stockholders to reform or oust the board, or in
making individual buy-sell decisions involving Disney securities. The sole issue
that this Court must determine is whether the particularized facts alleged in this
Complaint provide a reason to believe that the conduct of the Old Board in 1995
and the New Board in 1996 constituted a violation of their fiduciary duties.”87

This implied that the major issue the court had to decide was whether the directors
who had approved the severance package were independent and (financially)
disinterested or whether for other reasons their business judgment may have been
impaired. In the end, the analysis focused on the question, whether the board had taken its
responsibilities seriously or absconded them in favor of the chief executive officer,
Michael Eisner. In May 2003 the Chancery Court ruled that there was sufficient evidence
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that the board may have frivolously neglected its duties and that therefore the Ovitz’s
employment contract fell outside the directors business judgment rule.88 It therefore
allowed the case to move forward into full trial.
The major difference between the approach taken by the German court and that of
the Delaware court is the extent to which the substance of the decision about the
compensation package was deemed justiciable. Under Delaware law, judicial review is
very much limited to procedural aspects of decision making, and does not extent to
judicial review of the level of compensation.89 By contrast, German law not only
stipulates a reasonableness standard, but also states that the interests of the corporation as
a whole, not only those of shareholders, have to be taken into consideration. The court
did not leave the balancing act to the relevant decision makers, but itself decided on the
standard. In doing so it clearly confirmed the principle long established in German
corporate law that the interests of the corporation are not limited to its shareholders, and
that there is a corporate interest that can be clearly distinguished from the interest of other
stakeholders. In the case at hand the court suggested that the fact that Mannesmann was
loosing its independence as a result of the merger plan and that the merger also
contemplated spinning off some of its subsidiaries clearly spoke against the “corporate
interests”. The case is now under appeal at the Supreme Court (BGH).

V. Procedural Ground Rules in Private Law
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This section addresses primarily procedural ground rules in the context of
corporate law. With regards to contract law the ground rule in common and civil law
systems is that private parties may seek judicial recourse to enforce their rights. Parties
may choose arbitration over litigation, but absent a clearly expressed choice, the ground
rule is litigation. In fact, comparative analysis of litigation rates across Europe suggests
that Germany is quite a litigious society.90 It has also been correctly noted that German
civil procedural rules allow for a fairly adversarial procedure. Still, important differences
consistent with the approach developed in this paper, remain. Judges play a central role in
collecting evidence in contrast to civil procedure rules in the US that leave evidence
collection primarily to the parties of the law suit.91 German procedural law allocates the
powers to examine witnesses primarily to the judge.92 The parties may suggest questions
to the judge, but there is no cross-examination of witnesses.93 Moreover, the judge is
empowered and frequently exercises that power to call expert witnesses. Expert witnesses
are required by law to give “neutral” opinions and to use their special knowledge to help
the judge – not the parties - ascertain facts.94 Whether or not these procedural rules make
for more or less efficient discovery, whether they distort or help uncover the truth, is not
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the primary concern in this paper. The key is that important control rights are allocated
not to individual parties and their legal agents, but to an agent – the court - that is
supposed to be neutral and advance the social interests of litigation, i.e. the discovery of
the “truth”.95
Litigation in the area of corporate law offers a fertile ground for comparing the
allocation of litigation initiation rights across countries. In England and the US, the
initiation right is firmly vested with individual shareholders. Reading through English or
US corporate statutes one looks in vain for a provision that explicitly states that
shareholders have a right to sue to enforce their rights, as the right of shareholders to seek
judicial recourse preceded statutory corporate law and was thus assumed.96 Still, English
and US corporate law does not offer the same tools for bringing corporate officers and
directors to justice. English law has been much more reluctant to allow for derivative
action, i.e. shareholders’ rights to sue on behalf of the corporation.97 Even direct
shareholder actions are much less frequent in England than in the US. This may be
explained in part by the fact that English law vests key decision making rights with
shareholders and is less flexible in allowing them to delegate these rights to directors.98 In
addition, attorneys do not have the same incentives to function as “bounty hunters”,
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searching for suitable cases to offer their services.99 Despite these differences, it still
seems fair to say that the ground rule in both countries is that shareholders have a right to
sue, at least when their own rights and interests are at stake. Class action suits are not a
deviation, but an extension of the principle that enforcement rights are firmly vested with
the individual. Class actions allow individual shareholders to claim that they are acting on
part of other aggrieved parties, without having to organize them prior to bringing suit.
Even with regards to derivative action, the key question is whether an individual
shareholder can bring action on behalf of the corporation, or whether this should be the
task of the board.100 Not a single state in the US requires this question to be decided by
the collective, i.e. by the shareholder meeting.
By contrast, under German corporate law this has been the ground rule up to
now.101 The shareholder meeting shall determine whether or not a special auditor shall be
appointed to review managerial misconduct, or whether to bring action against the
management board.102 Alternatively, a group of minority shareholder representing at least
5% of corporate capital may request legal action, if they can credibly demonstrate that
they have been shareholders for at least three months. This may be a single shareholder,
but the threshold excludes shareholders holding less than 5% of total capital or capital
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valuing at least 500,000 Euros from initiation law suits on their own.103 While this
threshold is easier to reach than the previous threshold of 10%, the law still establishes a
powerful deterrent against litigation by requiring the minority to compensate the
corporation for the costs of litigation should the corporation loose partially or fully, at
least to the extent that the corporation’s costs exceed what it received as a result of the
law suit.104 Not surprisingly, according to German law, the default mechanism for
enforcing shareholder rights against management to this date is not litigation, but making
use of the corporation’s internal governance structure, i.e. the shareholder meeting, the
right to elect and dismiss members of the supervisory board, and their right to appoint
and dismiss (albeit prior to their usual 5-year term only for cause) members of the
management board.105 In exceptional cases, judicial review has been sought by way of
criminal, not civil law.106
In the past, shareholder litigation rights against management have been somewhat
extended by the Holzmüller decision of the German Supreme Court of 1982.107 It
established that shareholders have a right to bring an action with the aim of establishing
the management’s legal obligation to refer a decision to the shareholder meeting.108 The
decision is an excellent example for the prevailing ground rule, i.e. that legal actions are
the exception and not the rule for upholding and enforcing shareholder rights. In its
decision, the Court carefully carved out a legal vacuum, which justified the recognition of
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a right to sue, if only for a declaratory judgment, rather than for damages. The Court
discussed selective procedural rights of shareholders found in statutory corporate law,
including the right to challenge decisions of the shareholder meeting in court,109 and the
right to force the supervisory board to bring action against members of the management
board after tangible harm has been done.110 None of these provision, however, allowed
shareholders to enforce their right to vote on a major issue – in this case a capital increase
in a subsidiary controlled by the parent following the transfer of assets from the parent to
that subsidiary. The Court concluded that in cases where a substantive shareholder right
to vote on an issue is either explicitly granted in statutory law or recognized by the
courts, as in the case at hand, the enforcement of this right should not fail, just because
the corporate law failed to specify a procedure for enforcing it.111
Despite all the fanfare that accompanied this decision, it did not establish a
universal procedural rule, but maintained corporate law’s ground rule that only in
exceptional cases was judicial review of managerial actions an appropriate remedy for
aggrieved shareholders. In fact, it took until April 2004, or 22 years, for the next case
with a comparable fact pattern to be decided by the German Supreme Court112 - which
denied the claim on substantive grounds.113
An important exception to the limited rights to seek judicial review under current
law are the extensive rights of shareholders to challenge decisions of the shareholder
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meeting.114 Allowing individual shareholders to challenge in court the legality of
decisions taken at the shareholder meeting, but limiting their powers to sue members of
the management board, is consistent with the notion that relational contracting should
prevail over judicial enforcement. The only disputes that are referred to the courts are
disputes among shareholders, i.e. disputes for which there is no resolution within the
corporation, i.e. by electing a different board. Nonetheless, the legal device has created
costly hold-up problems and is at least in part responsible for the reluctance to extend
shareholder litigation rights.
Further evidence for differences in the allocation of procedural control rights are
claims in the context of mergers. Under Delaware law, shareholders who voted against a
merger may use appraisal rights,115 or under certain conditions, attach the merger
agreement on the grounds of fiduciary duty violations.116 The fairness of the price paid to
shareholders is assessed only once such a claim is made by individual shareholders, or, in
the case of fiduciary duty claims, in the form of class action suits. Thus, the allocation of
control rights is firmly vested with individual shareholders. By contrast, under German
law, every merger agreement has to be assessed by an independent agent before it is
submitted to the shareholder meeting for approval.117 This agent, the “merger reviewer”
(Verschmelzungsprüfer) is recommended by the management board, but appointed by the
court. The underlying rational seems to be that whether or not a merger agreement is fair
should not be left to a cost benefit analysis of individual shareholders, who may in the
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end decide not to pursue the matter for other reasons than the unfairness of the price. In
legal practice the difference may not be substantial, as in the US many firms will use
independent committees and their financial advisors to assess the fairness of a merger.
The difference, however, is that under German law such a mechanism is mandated by
law, whereas in the US it is a quasi voluntary arrangement aimed at avoiding an “entire
fairness” review by the courts.118 Companies that do not face legal challenge may thus
“get away” with less scrutiny in the US, not, however, in Germany.
Similarly, any claim for damages that may result from a merger transaction may
not be brought directly by a shareholder, but only by a “special representative” who is
appointed by the court upon request from individual shareholders, or creditors.119 This
special representative differs in important ways from a lead plaintiff’s attorney in an
American class action suit. The representative’s function is to compile all claims by
shareholders, creditors, or the merged company and ensure that primarily creditors of the
merged companies are satisfied from the compensation payments.120 Moreover, his or her
remuneration is regulated by law and is ultimately determined by the courts. In other
words, the special representative is not the agent of an aggrieved party, but a neutral
agent of the court.
In light of this analysis it should not come as a surprise that under German law
investors’ private rights of action are equally limited. In fact, the 1994 Securities Trading
Law explicitly stated that wrongful ad hoc disclosure does not give rise to individual
118
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claims.121 This has been recently confirmed in a decision of Germany’s Supreme Court,
which reiterated that ad hoc disclosure obligations of material company information had
the purpose of protecting the capital market as such, but not, at least not directly, the
interests of individual investors.122 The decision also declined to give a private right of
action to enforce Section 88 of the Stock Exchange Law (Börsengesetz), which prohibits
actions aimed at manipulating stock prices. The court held that the law’s purpose was to
ensure honesty of price formation on the market. Achieving honesty would also indirectly
serve the interests of individual investors, however, the alignment of social and individual
interests did not give rise for individual claims for compensation.123 Surprisingly, the
decision nevertheless held – and for the first time ever in Germany – that members of the
board could be held personally liable for misrepresentation of material information. This
ruling was based on a general tort provision that requires intentional misconduct in a
grossly unfair manner.124
There are signs that Germany is changing the allocation of procedural control
rights. First, the securities trading law has been amended to give investors a private right
of action against companies or their representatives who fail to comply with ad hoc
disclosure requirements or engage in insider trading.125 Moreover, a new draft law on the
corporate integrity and the modernization of legal claims126 is under review by the upper
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house, and is expected to enter into force before the end of 2005. The explicit purpose of
the law is the strengthening of shareholders’ litigation rights. The threshold for
appointing a special auditor to investigate wrongdoings by company insiders has been
reduced to shareholders representing only 1 percent (rather than 10) of total shares or
holding shares with a value of € 100,000 (rather than € 1,000,000).127 This change was,
however, accompanied by an important change on the allocation of costs. While the
previous version of § 146 AktG imposed the full cost for a court appointed special
auditor on the corporation, the suggested revision of this provision now adds a sentence
stating that in case the appointment was based on the initiator’s intentional or grossly
negligent representation of facts, he or she will have to bear the costs for the auditor and
the judicial proceedings for appointing her.128 This cost allocation could prove to be a
powerful deterrent, especially in light of the fact that under German corporate and civil
procedure rules, parties have only limited rights to discovery which limits their ability to
ascertain their claims.129
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With regards to the shareholders’ rights to initiate judicial review, the draft law
establishes a new procedure that allows individual shareholders who represent at least 1
percent of total stock of hold shares equaling € 100,000 in value to seek judicial
certification for bringing action against corporate insiders on behalf of the corporation
themselves – i.e. without a special court appointee.130 The court shall allow the litigation
to proceed if the shareholders can substantiate a claim that they have made a demand on
the corporation and that the corporation has been harmed by misconduct or major
violations of law or the corporate charter.131 The corporation has to reimburse the
claimants for their costs should the claim not prevail unless the claimants obtained the
right to bring litigation on the basis of intentionally or grossly negligently misrepresented
facts.132 The law seeks to limit the potential costs of litigation by also stipulating that
shareholders acting together can be reimbursed only for one attorney, unless they can
show that additional attorneys were indispensable for pursuing the matter.133 At the same
time, shareholders’ ability to challenge decisions of the shareholder meeting shall be
curtailed according to the proposed law. In the future a decision can be challenged on the
grounds that information provided to shareholders was insufficient or incorrect, only if an
“objectively deciding” shareholder would regard the information as crucial for exercising
his rights.134 The provision implicitly empowers courts to dismiss claims that they deem
to be abusive, as they will define how an “objectively deciding” shareholder might act.
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Finally, the Ministry of Justice is currently proposing a new law that would
introduce “model trials” for investor claims into the German system.135 The purpose of
this law is to bundle multiple law suits on related issues in a more efficient manner than
is currently possible. In particular, the result of a model trial would be binding on other
claims brought on the basis of the same fact pattern. For this legal effect to arise,
however, a claim must be filed with the appellate court to hold a model trial and after
such a trial has been decided, individual law suits will proceed for final resolution. The
draft law explicitly rejects the US style class action suit, which binds not only the named
plaintiffs, but other represented members of the class. The reason given in the proposal is
that Germany is committed to an “individualized” litigation system.136 This argument is
interesting from the perspective of the analysis presented in this paper, which suggests
that Germany favors collective or state centered approaches over individualized ones.
Formally, the notion that a class action suit collectivizes an individual law suit is correct
and in that sense German law is indeed more individualistic. Functionally, however, it
allocates the entire cost of a law suit to that individual. In the case these costs are
prohibitively high, it thereby effectively denies judicial recourse. Conversely, in order to
allow litigation to go forward, the US system subordinates individual claims to the
interests of the class with the effect that the balance of bargaining power shifts from the
defendant to the lead plaintiff and/or its attorney.
As the above discussion suggests, different legal systems allocate (or at least,
have allocated) the right to initiate judicial review in the context of corporate law quite
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differently. Whereas in the US individual shareholders and their attorney have the power
to initiate law suits, in Germany they could only demand action from the corporation or
request a special representative to be appointed by the court. The allocation of initiation
powers reflects the same preference for individual over collective interests (or the
reverse) that can also be found in substantive ground rules. The US, a common law
jurisdiction and LME favors universal litigation and individual initiation rights. By
contrast, Germany has opted for selective litigation rights and, even when doing so, tend
to vest the collective, rather than in the individual with the power to initiate legal action.
The changes now under way in Germany indicate an important change in the
allocation of procedural ground rules. Private litigation will be given more room in the
future and its usefulness for enforcing corporate law and shareholder rights more
generally is finally being acknowledged. Whether the proposed changes will, however,
fundamentally alter the operation of the German system remains to be seen. There are
reasons to caution against high expectations that shareholder and investor law suits will
play an important role in the future. While the threshold for initiating litigation has been
reduced significantly, the cost of litigation and the risk of costs litigants bear when the
case is dismissed remain substantial. Future judicial interpretation of what would amount
to intentional or grossly negligent misrepresentation of facts the triggered a law suit will
be crucial for any litigant’s cost benefit analysis prior to initiating legal actions. Absent
extensive discovery rules and shareholder information rights,137 which might reduce the
risk of misrepresentation, this uncertainty alone might deter litigation. In addition, the
fear of creating attorney agency problems has led the German legislature to propose a
rule that limits compensation for attorneys fees to a single attorney per case, even if the
137
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case is brought by several shareholders. In light of the staggering awards of attorney fees
in the United States, the fear may be justified, but it also is likely to undermine the role of
attorneys as “private attorney generals”, which has been identified as crucial for the
private enforcement regime in the US.138 Finally, litigation might also be deterred by
uncertainties about outcomes. As has been noted, given the traditional hostility towards
shareholder litigation, there is very little case law interpreting and clarifying the
Aktiengesetz, the German law on publicly held corporations. Case law developed for the
law of limited liability corporations (GmbH), which is much more voluminous, may
serve as a guideline, but clarification as to the extent to which courts will apply the same
principles to publicly held corporations is still warranted. Moreover, unlike the UK or
Delaware corporate law, German corporate law has not been written to be litigated, but
more as guideline for the corporation’s stakeholders’ main rights and responsibilities,
subject to bargaining within the corporation, not external judicial review. Many
provisions include ambiguous terms that could give courts ample room for interpretation.
The Mannesmann case is one example as to how this might be done. The particular
approach taken by the court of first instance in that case may have been influenced by the
fact that it was a criminal, not a civil law suit. Nevertheless, the case does suggest that
courts may declare many of the ambiguous provisions justiciable and may interpret them
in a fashion that is consistent with social preferences that value the collective good over
individual interests, the greater role shareholders may now play in litigation
notwithstanding.
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VI. Conclusion

The paper set out to explain the apparent affinity between the type of market
economy and the type of legal system operating in a given country. Among the 17 major
OECD countries that have been subject of much analysis in the debate on corporatist vs.
market systems, or coordinated vs. liberal market economies, all LMEs are common law
countries, and all CMEs are civil law countries. This paper has sought to explain this link.
It argues that social preferences for individual rights vs. social norms on one hand, and
for the pursuit of individual enforcement of legal rights vs. bargaining and other
collective enforcement mechanisms, on the other, are deeply embedded in legal systems.
They can be found in ground rules in areas of the law well beyond labour rights and
union organizations, which have typically been the focus of analysis in the debate about
corporatist systems. The paper developed ideal types for the allocation of substantial and
procedural ground rules and illustrated them with examples drawn from contract and
corporate law in primarily two jurisdictions – Germany and the US. These jurisdictions
may not be representative for all CMEs/civil law systems or LMEs/common law systems.
More research will need to be done to establish that similar ground rules can be found in
other jurisdiction and that they confirm the link between legal families and types of
market economies.
Assuming that this link can be further substantiated, it has important implications
for the comparative analysis of economic/legal systems. It suggests that the rules and
regulations that have commonly been identify with the corporatist system (or CMEs),
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may only be the tail end of norms engrained in formal rules and complementary
institutions that govern these economies. Their adoption was not inevitable, as societies
could have “agreed” on less far reaching legal representation of such norms. Moreover,
societies, or lawmakers as their representatives, may choose to change specific rules. Yet,
such a change, at least in isolation, is unlikely to change the social preferences that
prevail in these economies. Even in the absence of specific legal arrangement, the basic
allocation of substantive and procedural decision making rights will continue to influence
lawmaking and adjudication.
That is not to say that more far reaching change is impossible. Recent changes in
procedural ground rules governing corporate law in Germany are a case in point. They
reflect a different perception of shareholder rights and as such may be indicative of a
more general change in social preferences towards greater recognition of individual rights
and procedural powers. Still, final assessment has to await the development of a body of
case law that would indicate whether the reallocation of procedural ground rules also
implies a shift in substantive ground rules away from concepts that give primacy to the
interests of the corporation as a community of interests, to those of shareholders. While
changes in procedural ground rules could in fact trigger lasting change over time, for the
time being it seems to be premature to use the still marginal changes in specific legal
rules as a sign of convergence of legal and/or economic systems.139
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Appendix: Tables and Figures
Table 1
LME
Australia
Canada
Ireland
New Zealand
United Kingdom
United States

CME
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
Iceland
Germany
Japan
Netherlands
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
Source: Hall & Soskice (2000)
Figure 1: Substantive Ground Rules
Contractible

Non-contractible

Individual Preferences

Unlimited contractual freedom

Bright line rules limit freedom of
contract

Social norm
conditionality

Judicial enforcement of contractual
rights dominates
Standardized contracts with social
norm conditionality

Judicial enforcement of contractual
rights
Mandatory regulation of socially
sensitive issues without opt out

Limited judicial enforcement

Little judicial enforcement

Figure 2: Procedural Default Rule
Universal
Individual

Collective

Selective

Wide use of judicial enforcement

Moderate use of judicial
enforcement

Extensive formal contracting
Relational contracting dominates

Mix of formal and relational
contracting
Relational contracting dominates

Moderate judicial review

Limited judicial review
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Figure 3: Ground rules in LMEs and CMEs
LME/Common Law
Substantive Default Rule

Contractibility/
Primacy of individual preferences

Procedural Default Rule

Universal justiciability/
Individual initiation rights

CME/Civil Law
Contractibility is socially
conditioned and/or limited by
mandatory law
Selective justiciability/
Collective initiation rights

Figure 4: Examples
LME/Common Law
Substantive Default Rule
Procedural Default Rule

Private contracts are valid unless
they violate procedural rules and are
in “bad faith”
Individual initiation rights

CME/Civil Law
Private contracts are governed by
“good faith”
Individual litigation rights limited
and frequently delegated to the
collective and/or a neutral agent
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